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The idea behind the Aotearoa Feminist Judgments Project is simple, yet
powerful: "Imagine a feminist judge sitting on the bench alongside the original
judge/s in a particular case. How might she have decided the case and written her
decision?"' The collection consists of 25 judgments: 19 are feminist judgments
(the Pakehi muka (strand)), and six came to be known during the project as
the mana wahine judgments (the Maori muka). Carefully integrated and yet
separate, together they create a strong and cogent two-stranded rope - Te Rino.
The collection is edited by Aotearoa legal academics Elisabeth McDonald
and Rhonda Powell from University of Canterbury, and Mimari Stephens
from Victoria University of Wellington. They are joined by international
editor Rosemary Hunter, from Queen Mary University of London. Hunter
brings to the project her wealth of experience from other countries' feminist
judgment projects, including her leading role in the English2 and Australian3
projects, and providing support to the Northern/Irish, Indian and United
States feminist judgment projects.4
The concept for Te Rino, as with the other countries' projects that
preceded it, is that authors write their judgments within the constraints of the
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"precedent, legislation, style and relevant legal and social science research, which
existed at the time".5'Within those limits, the judgments are then "exercises in
imagination, designed to make us see possibilities in law that, arguably, the
original judges in these cases may not have seen".' The judgments in Te Rino
span ioo years, from the 1914 decision of Waipapakura v Hempton to the z015
decisions of Taylor v Attorney-General,' Seales v Attorney-General,9 and R v S."'
As anyone who is familiar with those decisions will recognise, the feminist
judgments in this volume are not just those that "have historically been the
focus of feminist critique, such as criminal, employment and family"." While
the volume does contain judgments from those areas of law, it also encompasses
judgments on civil rights,"2 social welfare; medical law,14 customary rights,'
and the environment. 6 The focus of the feminist perspective ranges from
female litigants (defendants and appellants), through to the environment in
'Justice' Wheen's ecofeminist approach to Squid Fishery Management Company
Ltd v Minister for Fisheries,"7 and to Papatuatidnuku in Bruce v Edwards;8` The
project engages with judgments from all levels of our courts, as well as the
Human Rights Review Tribunal. Each judgment is preceded by a commentary
discussing the broader societal context of the original judgment and explaining
the judgment writers' approach.
As the editors point out in Chapter 3, there are a number of unifying
themes across the judgments.9 First, anti-subordination - that is, "a concern
5 At ix.
6 At ix.
7 Waipapakura vHempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (SC).
8 Taylor vAttorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706.
9 Seales vAttorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239.
10 R vS [2015] NZHC 8o.
11 At 8.
12 Taylor vAttorney General, above n 8; Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 307.
13 Ruka v Department of Social Welfare [1997] I NZLR 154 (CA); Lawson v Housing New Zealand HC
Auckland M538/9 4 , z9 October 1996.
14 Seales vAttorney-General, above n 9; Hallagan v Medical Council ofNew Zealand HC Wellington CIV-
2010-485-222, z December zoio; Re W/PPPR] (1993) 11 FRNZ io.
is Bruce v Edwards [zooz] NZCA 294; Waipapakura v Hempton, above n 7.
16 Squid Fishery Management Company Ltd vMinister ofFisheries CA3 9/04, 7 April 2004; West Coast ENT
Inc v Buller Coal Ltd [2013] NZSC 87.
17 At 361-384.
18 Bruce v Edwards, above n 15.
19 McDonald, Powell, Stephens and Hunter, above n I, at 3235.
193
[2017] NZWLJ
that legal rules should not perpetuate structures of male power and female
subordination".2o Second, a critique of the public/private distinction and
recognition of the value of home, privacy and care. Third, a critique of the
balancing of rights and the tendency to accord more weight to rights that are
more important to men. Fourth, the feminist ethic of care, applied not only to
people, but also to the environment and non-human animals.
There are reminders, as the editors note from the outset, that there is
no single feminist approach: "feminism is not monolithic. There are multiple
strands within feminist legal theory and the judgments do not take a uniform
position" . This is illustrated by the judgment in Seales v Attorney-General,22
which shows that, even within one strand of feminist thinking, diverse
approaches might be taken. Citing academic Carol Gilligan's work, 'Justice'
Manning applies the feminist ethic of care, observing:23
As society's primary caregivers, many women tend to define themselves first
and foremost in terms of their family's needs. When they become elderly
or suffer from a debilitating condition or disability, and are themselves in
need of care, they may find it difficult to accept the role reversal in being
cared for. The inculcated response of self-sacrifice and the fear of being an
emotional, financial and time-consuming burden to their families, whose
interests they are used to putting first over a lifetime, makes them vulnerable
to feel pressure to take the assisted dying option, even if they are initially
ambivalent or they do not yet wish to die.
Her solution is that, to protect women, suicide should continue to be
criminalised.24 This judgment illustrates that within a single branch of feminist
theory, such as the ethic of care, it is possible for different conclusions to be drawn
- in this case a kind of paternalism that many strands of feminism would reject.
Te Rino is feminist not only in content but also in the way in which it
was produced. The project was collaborative, bringing together many authors
and supporters, both individuals and organisations. There are 57 contributors
to this volume: four editors, who also authored contributions, and 53 other
authors, with "most senior women law academics in New Zealand" involved in
zo At 3 2.
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some way, as well as practitioners and a number of junior women academics."
There are also several males among the contributors, including the unique
contribution of retired Family Court Judge John Adams, who rewrote his own
judgment.26 This demonstrates, as Mimari Stephens observes, that to engage
in applying different ways of looking at the law, "We don't need qualifications
of learning or ethnicity or gender, so much as a commitment to being open".27
Funding was provided by the New Zealand Law Foundation, which assisted
the authors to meet face-to-face in workshops to engage in a "collaborative
writing process, drawing on feminist (collective) methodology".
The most distinctive contribution is the development of the mana
wahine judgments. Mimari Stephens provides a fascinating glimpse into the
production of these judgments in the first introductory chapter.29 She writes
about her experience in the Maori Women's Refuge and discovering the value
of "Maori having space to do important things in Maori ways without needing
the permission, oversight or approval of Pakehi women" .3o This insight is
carried over into the development of the mana wahine judgments in Te Rino,
which, although intertwined with the Pikehi judgments, sit separately. The
mana wahine commentary and judgments are marked with shaded grey boxes
to highlight the difference between this muka and the pakeha muka. It strives to
be "a model for intersectionality in practice", recognising that Maori women
experience sexism and discrimination "based on ethnic or cultural identity, as
well as deprivation and marginalisation based on the legacy of colonialism".32
Stephens, discussing the purpose of the mana wahine judgments, suggests they
"bring the complex and contradictory lives of Maori women to the fore" but
also "legitimise Maori ways of thinking and cultural practice", not only for the
benefit of Maori women, but "ultimately for all Miori".33 The most significant
25 At 8.
26 V v V [zooz] NZFLR 1105 (FC).
27 At 5.
28 At xi.
z9 There are three introductory chapters in total: i) an overview of the editors approach to the project;
z) explaining Maori legal concepts to any international readers; and 3) the history of the international








contribution of this volume, in terms of its place internationally, is that it
may "feed into the possibility, as yet inchoate, of an international indigenous
judgments project".14
Another particularly local insight that the book provides is its discussion
of the way that our judges are trained to write judgments. Margot Schwass
provides training for the New Zealand judiciary on judgment writing, and
she was employed to train the authors of the Te Rino judgments. The editors
recount that the training focussed on writing "issues-driven judgment", as an
"issues-based structure works well for writers and readers as it results in a clear,
succinct and readable judgment"." This approach is, however, the antithesis of
the feminist approach, as Rosemary Hunter notes:36
... the emphasis on clear issue-identification, minimal factual description
and parsimony in reasoning, militated against many of the things we were
trying to achieve as feminist judges.
The feminist approach, as is illustrated in many of the judgments in this
collection, begins with acknowledgment of the participants and a focus on the
story at the outset of the judgment, not with legal issues.
Direct engagement with the people in court is part of feminist judging and
is also a feature of therapeutic and procedural justice approaches to judging.37 It
is a method designed to involve people in the justice process and acknowledge
them as people, rather than abstracting them to their procedural role -
defendant, appellant, or victim, for example. The opening acknowledgment in
Ruka v Department ofSocial Welfare is particularly illustrative of that approach.
'Justice' Stephens, after acknowledging her fellow judges in Te Reo and English,
opens her judgment as follows:38
My learned friends have recounted in some considerable detail the
extraordinary extent of the abuse Ms Ruka experienced between 1974 or
1975 and 1992. I need not revisit those accounts in detail; but I hope that Ms
Ruka will now have the opportunity to lead a very different kind of life to
34 At x.
35 At o.
36 At 14 .
37 Rosemary Hunter, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack "Judging in lower courts: Conventional,
procedural, therapeutic and feminist approaches" (zo16) 12(3) Int J Law Context 337
38 At 9 4 .
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that which led her here before us.
Kia hora te marino
Kia whakapapa pounamu te moana
Kia tere te karohirohi
Let the calm be widespread,
Let the ocean lie flat,
May it shimmer.
This is an affecting and powerful opening; a letting out of breath, a gathering
in, a signal of hope. The acknowledgement and engagement of the participants
in the justice process is also achieved by giving participants pseudonyms to
humanise them. In Re W[PPPR],39 for example, the pseudonym "W" from the
original judgment is replaced with the pseudonym "Katrina Williams", which
helps to focus the judgment on Ms Williams, and counters the tendency to
focus on the unborn baby or the opinions of the medical specialists.40
The judgments then, in general, pay close attention to women and to
the story that culminated in a court case, rather than taking an issues-driven
approach. As Rhonda Powell writes, "One of the ways in which a judge can be
'feminist' is by listening to women's stories, hearing the perspectives of woman
litigants and recognising women's experiences in the way that they recount the
facts of cases, so that these experiences also become legal truths".41
This is perhaps most plainly illustrated in the judgment in R v Wang,
a case about a woman who killed her abusive husband while he was asleep.
In producing the Te Rino version of R v Wang, the authors went beyond the
original judgment, also accessing the court file and notes of evidence, which
included facts omitted from the original judgment. Lexie Kirkconnell-Kawana
and Alarna Sharratt, writing the commentary for the judgment, observe:42
In the original judgment, the Court minimised the extensive history of
abuse, reducing the description of the harm within the relationship to the
one line that it was a 'loveless and coercive marriage'.
39 Re W[PPPR], above n 14.
40 At 17 2.




The court file, however, recorded extensive additional evidence presented
at trial, including Ms Wang's experience as a Chinese immigrant woman
isolated in New Zealand, suffering from a major depressive illness, subjected
to extensive and ongoing abuse, and whose attempts to seek assistance from
friends had been rebuffed with advice to endure the abuse. This judgment, and
many others in the volume, are stark reminders that judgments do not simply
present neutral fact, but like all texts, are selective and performative pieces of
writing.43 The judgments demonstrate a method for paying attention to what
might otherwise escape notice. As Glazebrook J and Judge Caren Fox note in
the foreword/he kupu whakataki, the book can help judges to "recognise the
possibility of bias and flawed decision making processes and do their best to
eliminate them".44 They then go on to sound a word of warning:45
But judges must take care not to replace one set of biases for another. A
judge's overriding duty is to decide cases according to the law, even if this
leads to a result that is against their inclination.
This comment suggests that feminist judging might be a form of bias, rather
than a way of ensuring equality. However, the judgments do not try to impose
a feminist perspective at the cost of legal principle. Instead, they actively engage
with lived experiences of women (and the environment), creating space to see
cases in ways that we have been blind to and may be continuing to be blind
to. In that sense, the feminist project has larger implications, showing us how
to engage with facts in a different way, by letting those facts inform the law,
rather than disregarding or ignoring them. It brings into sharp relief what it is
that legal thinkers ignore when they engage with text. As academic Elizabeth
Mertz has observed, when we use the phrase "thinking like a lawyer", we are
"often implying that it involves a honing of general analytic ability".4 6 Mertz
argues that "thinking like a lawyer" is really:47
... a very particular, culturally laden kind of thinking ... [which] is socially
and institutionally grounded in specific practices and power relationships.
43 Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey "Analysing Documentary Realities" in David Silverman (ed)
Qualitative Research (3rd ed, Sage Publications, London, zol) at 77.
44 At viii.
45 At viii.
46 Elizabeth Mertz The Language of Law School: Learning to "Think Like a Lawyer" (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2007) at 98.
47 At 98.
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It asks some kinds of questions while neglecting others and makes sharp
demands for proof in some places where elsewhere it accepts unproven
assumptions.
The Te Rino judgments shine a bright light on these institutional practices
while also providing a workable remedy to the problems they identify. The
judgments and the commentary that precede them, are a powerful means of
teaching us to see a legal case through a different lens, helpful both in the
classroom and for established researchers, practitioners, and members of the
judiciary.
As Mimari Stephens notes, there is much to learn from a generalist
legal project such as this.48 This collection offers an opportunity to step back
and survey the land of the law, and to do so with fresh eyes - a valuable
opportunity when many are practising or researching in highly specialised
areas. Hopefully this is reason enough for anyone to purchase the volume, but if
further motivation is required, royalties from the project will go to supporting
Community Law initiatives that help women to access legal support and
education. Na to rourou, ni taku rourou ka ora ai te iwi.
48 At 14.
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